With sustained appreciation of the U.S. dollar over the past 4 yc;lrs, the exchange satc has again taken on importance for agriculture. This overview paper revisits the analysis of exchange rate impacts, reviewin2 the relcvant concept~~al argunlents, hu~nmariiing the evidence economi5ts and ;tpricullural econon~ists have ~narshaled from the 1970s and the 1980s and from se\;eral more recent papers, presenting some illustrative recent empirical analysis of exchange rate effccts, and briefly exatmining the detrimental consequences that s~~staincd appreciation of the clollar is having on U.S. Sarm policy.
after the United States g a v e u p its tixed e xchange rate, the economic turmoil that followed the initial devaluation and subsecli~ent floating of the dollar against other major currencies w a s unlikely to have been fully anticipated. T h e turmoil included, for the United Da\id Ordcn is profcssor, Department o f Agricultural and Applied Ecunomics. Vil-ginia Tech, Blacksburp. VA.
invited paper prescntecl at the atintlal meeting ol the Southern Agricultural Economic\ Association. Orlando. FL. February 3-5. 2002. States. substantial inflation through the 1970s. then movements in the real exchange nttesequential appreciation followed by depreciation during the 1980s-in excess of 4 0 % o v e r periods o f several years. Forty percent is a significant realignment in relative prices, a n d several years is long enough t o force economic adjustments.
F o r agriculture. the "new macroeconomics" o f the world e c o n o m y has had substantial implications. Nominal agricultural prices skyrocketed, along with other primary commodity prices, early in the 1970s. with inflationary monetary policies a n d dollar flexibility being at least partly responsible. International capital flows expanded after t w o decades o f slow growth. T h e U.S. trade delicit turned increasingly negative, but agricultnral exports. particularly exports through c o m~n e r c i a l channels (not t'oreign aicl), rose strongly through the 1970s. B y the late 1970s, agricultural exports were LIP, but real agricultural prices were down. T h i n g s got m u c h worse w h e n the dollar began t o appreciate beginning in 1980. Exports fell in value by nearly o n e third by 1085. and with high interest rates, land prices c o~~l JOIIYIINI of . -\ S~~(~I I /~I I~L I / (ilrd Ap/~lictl E(.or~ornic,\. A~i g~~s t ZOOZ financial crisis and recession, followed by the devaluation and floating of the Brazilian currency. It continued with the weakening of the euro since its launch as a common currency, the depreciation of the dollars of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, and. recently, the devaluation of the Argeritine peso. change rate has again taken on importance for One view that emerged Crom this period of U.S. agriculture. This overview paper revisits turbulence was that macroecononiic policy ef-the analysis of exchange rate impacts. I take fects on agriculture, particularly effects deliv-three thrusts: ( I ) reviewing the relevant coneretl through the exchange rate, can swamp ceptual arguments, (2) summarizing the evithose of agricultural policy. Consistent with dence economists marshaled fro111 the 1970s this view. stability was restored to the U.S. and the 1980s and S-om several more recent agricultural sector only when an effort to bring down the value of the dollar after 1985 essentially reestablished its pre-I980 real value (see Figure 1 ). Farm export began to increase again, farm incorne strengthened. and the portion of that income coming from government transfers declined. The attention of the f ;~r n~ business community and policy establishment turned to other concerns. among the111 the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade negotiations and regional integration under the North American Free Trade Agreement. In domestic policy, the 1996 farm bill took steps toward reduced intervention in agricult~~ral production and raised the possibility of, but did not guarantee, r e d~~c e d fut~u-e income transfers to the farm sector (Orden. Paarlbcrg, and Roe).
After 9 years of relative exchange rate stability from 1988 to 1996, we are now i n the fourth year of a second period of sustained appreciation ot' the U.S. dollar. The dollar's I-ise in vuluc since I997 hcgan with the Asian papers, and (3) presenting some recent illustrative cmpil-icnl analysis of exchange rate effects. This leads me to briefly consider the detrimental impact that sustained itppl-eciation of the dollar is having on U.S. farm policy.
Exchange Rates and Agricultural Trade
The classic modern article on exch:tnge rate impacts on agriculture in the United States was written by G. Edw:~rd Schuh and published in the Anieuic,cirl Jo~irrlcil c?f'A~ric.ulturril Ec~orzomic,.~ in February 1 974. Schuh niade the fundamental argument that the exchange rate was an omitted variable in the econornic analysis of the U.S. farm sectol and he drew sweeping implications. Tlirouglio~~t the 1950s, the "farm problem" had been described as one of technical change that induced a shift in production toward land-augmenting intermediate and capital inputs. lowered the real prices at which agricultural products could be procured, and p~~t severe adjustment pressure on the farm sector, particularly farm labor. Agricultural policy interventions of the time (high support prices and land retirements) were perceived to overvalue agricultural I-ewurces relative to free markets, leading to welfare costs and the paradox of a co~rntry with an advanced agriculture being dependent on export subsidization instead of being competitive in world markets. Schuh argued for a new interpretation of these developments: The U.S. dollar had become overvalued in the early 1950s, which had depressed agricultural prices and exports. This led to a socially inefficient crt~cl't-\~aluu-tiorz of agricultural resources. It induced even more technical change. thus aggravating what would have been in any case a serious problem of structural adjustment. It resulted in a larger share of the benetits of technical change going to consumers rather than producers. According to this interpretation. farm policies had served to offset negative exchange rate impacts on the farm production sector. When those farm policies started to shift in the 1960s toward letting prices fall and compensating fttrmers with direct cash payments instead of high price supports, prices fell toward the disequilibrium levels associated with exchange rate overvaluation. Devaluations in the 1970s restored the dollar to a more nearly equilibriurn value, and as a consequence, agriculture experienced a macroeconomic-led boom. As Schuh put it: "If this interpretation is correct, an important share of the rise in agricultural prices in mid-1973 is a result of monetary phenomena which induced an export boom in an economy that was already responding to expansive monetary policies, and in the case of agriculture, increased the foreign demand for U.S. output at the same time that this demand was already rising from temporary bad weather conditions in other countries and a temporary decline in the Peruvian fishmeal industry" (p. 12).
Schuh's initial exposition of the effects of an exchange rate overvaluation on markets was based on a simple partial-equilibrium framework. For a small exporting country facing fixed world prices, an overvalued exchange rate lowers the world price in dornestic currency proportionately. The resulting increases in domestic demand and reductions in domestic supply depend on own-price elasticities and export quantity and value fall. In the large-country case, foreign and domestic prices diverge again by the extent of the overvaluation, with elasticities of supply and demand of both trading partners affecting the extent to which the domestic price falls or the foreign price rises. In this framework, focusing on the long run, Schuh made rather modest claims for the sustained price effects from devaluation. In a reply to a comment on his article, he argued that if a devaluation of 13% constituted an equilibrium, the relative price of agriculti~ral products might rise by around 10%. "after adjustments have worked themselves out" (Schuh 1975, p. 699) .
We now use a much richer microeconomic framework to assess exchange rates and market equilibrium. Drawing on trade theory, the real exchange rate I \ viewed as the relative prices of traded to nontraded good\. Real exchange rate Inovements accornrnodate changes in technology, income levels, or borrowing from abroad that require either higher or lower relative prices of nontraded goods (appreciation or depreciation, respectively) to clear those market\. Thi\ i \ different fi-orn affecting a country's terms of trade: real exchange rate movements affect flexible prices of imports and exports in a symmetric way, and a lot of individual prices are changing (and may need to be accounted for) when the real exchange rate is considered.
The linkage of real exchange rates to international capital flows (with these flows driving goods and services trade more than the other way around) is also well understood, as is the interdependence this creates between countrie\' macroeconomic polices. There remain disagreements about the effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policie\ and about how to rnanage domestic and international constraints, but Sewer and fewer countries seem tempted to Haunt the evident linkages. Europe has gone so far as to harrnoni~e monetary and fiscal policie5 enough to su\tain the euro as a unified currency-a rather large step back to a Bretton Woods type of arrangement, and one that might have been unthinkable without the rel- The earliest attempts to evaluate Scliuh's ar-ter 1973, this nonneutrality argument was givgurnent e~npirically were conducted in a par-en renewed impetus by the influential model tial-equilibrium spatial modeling framework of Rudiger Dornbusch. I n the Dornbusch niodand focused on assessing the elasticities of el, monetary expansions that lower domestic price transmission and of supply and demand interest rates cause exchange rate overshooting that affectetl trade of agricultural products. so that subsequent appreciation maintains arThese assessments see~iied able to attribute bitrage conditions equating returns on domcsonly a small part of the substantial relative tic and foreign assets. Several research efforts, price movements in the early 1970s to the ex-including that of Hughes and Penson and that change rate-results consistent with Schuh's Of Rausser et al., provided a basis for assessing long-run clairn but not supportive of the ex-these effects on exchange rates and, by extenchange rate being as significant an omitted sion, on flexible agricultural prices in tradivariable as Schuh described, at least when it tional econOlnetric models, came to the inflationary farm sector boom that Rausser et Llsed results from such a model was occurring. Partial equilibrium spatial to that monetary policy had modeling s~lbseq~lel~tly gave way to cornpllt-'ztaxed7-agricLlltllre significantly i n the early able general-equilibriu111 niodels--models that , C)8Os. offered a more complcte linkage of real exYet a third approach to empirical modeling change rate movements to underlying causes, adopted the of time series i,nalysis to accounted for market equilibriurii for ~nultiple seek causal relationships monetary traded and nontraded goods. and pro\:icled indicators and agriculture and dynamic ilnsomewhat more support for real exchange rate pacts Of monetary policy on the effects on agriculture. early 1980s. Christopher Sirns, from the UniOn another level. the attempt to understand versity of Minnesatn, pioneered [he use exchange rate impacts on agriculture became slnall dynalnic models withOut too Inally a redirected, like macroeconomics itself. by the ,,,.iori restriction.; as an to turbulence in the world economy. Exchange identified imposed either by tradirates did not settle down to an equilibriu~n de-tional ~~~~~~i~~~ or by the new neoclassical valuation of around 13% during the 1970s. r,tional-expectations school, work on the emand niacroeconomic polices seemed to be pirical modeling of monetary effects on agrispinning out of control cornpared with the re/-culture by Bcssler, Chambers. ancl Orden ative stability of the preceding period. This sit- (198(ja,b) , among others, adopted this apuation brought attention to Scliuh's broader proach. claim about the importance of monetary polIt is appealing to think that monetary eficy for agriculture. Did loose monetary policy fects on agricultural prices and trade can bc cause flexible prices (like those for agricultural measured easily with small dynamic models if products) to overshoot their long-run equilib-these effccts are important, but such measurerium levels, rising relative to more slowly ad-ment has turned out to be a fairly difficult task. justing (sticky) prices in other sectors? Did I could detect little effect from the money SUPthis account for the price boom in agriculture ply on real U.S. agricultural prices o r export that Schuh had identified with the exchange values in recursive vector autoregressive rate? Later, when int'lation was being squeezed (VAR) models (Orden 1986a,b) . Shocks to tiout of the U.S. economy and the dollar appre-nancial rnarket variables, such as a short-term interest rate or the exchange rate, had lalger impacts. These shocks explained 20% of forecast error variance for exports and 10% for real agricultural prices I year ahead, and over 50% and 25%. respectively, for a three-year forecast horizon. An increase in the interest rate or the appreciation of the dollar had a depressing effect on agriculture. The dynamic responses to \uch shocks (which were highly correlated) looked plausible for a monetary contract~on. Sim\ ( 1980, 1996) has remained skeptical of this interpretation, arguing that interest rate shocks more likely come frorn real events. but other macroeconomists have adopted the view that monetary policy shocks \how up in small dynamic models through interest rates (Lane) .
Bradshaw and Orden pursued the modeling of exchange rate effects on agriculture in a narrow sense. We comparecl the out-of-sample forecasting performance of univariate models of monthly U.S. corn, wheat. and soybean export sales with forecasts from bivariate models that included the exchange rate. The idea was to test Schuh's exchange rate hypothesis in a tightly \pecified model. If the exchange rate mattered, we hypothesized, it would help predict subsequent export sales. We found that our best bivariate forecasting ~nodels outperformed our best univariate models in statistically significant ways, but we would not have found that result if we had limited our search to models specitied with a common lag slructure, often a standard procedure in dynamic time-series modeling.
Orden and Fackler went in a different direction to develop further evidence on monetary impacts. We specified a nonrecursive structurally identitied nod el of oil prices, supply and demand for aggregate output, money supply and demand, international effects (represented through the exchange rate), and agricultural prices. Short-run responses to the money supply shock looked plausible: money and output rose first, the dollar depreciated, and the price level increased slowly. We concluded that monetary shocks raised real agricultural prices for about 1 year, but our empirical estimates also led us to conclude that monetary policy shocks had not been the dominant source of agric~~ltural price instability.
Within macroeconomics, the magnitude of monetary effects on real exchange rates and trade continue to be assessed. Eichenbaum and Evans found relatively little monetary effect on the cxchange rate, while Prasad reported that nominal shocks explain a significant fraction of short-run real exchange rate variability and have short-and long-run effects on the real trade balance. Building on Lane's openeconomy model with a sticky-price sector, Fisher and Huh specified VAR models for real output. the real exchange rate, and the real trade balance for each of the G-7 countries.
They imposed restrictions identifying a structural model with a supply shock as the only source of long-run output effects, a demand shock with possible contemporaneous and short-run effects on output, and a monetary shock with lagged, but not permanent, o~~t p u t effects. Fisher and Huh found that positive monetary shocks cause depreciation and improvement in the real trade balance and that monetary shocks explain a substantial proportion of the forecast error variance for these real variables.
In terms of monetary impacts on ngriculture, Dorfman and Lastrapes and, most recently, Saghaian, Reed. and Marchant have also brought developments in identifying time series n~odels to bear on the measurement of relative price effects. Dosfman and Lastrapes imposed the theory-derived long-run restriction of monetary neutrality to identify policy shocks and used Bayesian techniques to investigate the sensitivity of their results to various aspects of model specification. Their identifying restriction insured that price level. sectoral prices, and money rose equip]-oportionately in the long run. They found plausible short-run monetary policy impacts on interest rates, output, and price level. Again, monetary shocks raised real agricultural prices in the short run but explained only a small fraction of crop and livestock relative price variability. itly incorporated a flex-price as well as a sticky-price sector. Their theoretical results showed that overshooting in the flex-price sector dampens exchange rate overshooting. The results of their empirical analysis indicate that agricultural commodity prices and inclustrial prices overshoot their long-run equilibrium i n relation to thc money supply. with ~igric~~ltural prices again rising relative to industrial prices in the short run.
Another Direct Look at Exchange Rate Impacts
I now return to the relatively narrow task of evaluating exchange rate effects on agricultural trade and prices directly, without specification of an underlying structural model of monetary shocks. (Figure 1 ) and the real export value are apparent: turning points in the direction of the export value correspond to those of the exchange rate, and exports rise with depreciation and fall with appreciation. Price and quantity effects reinforce each other for export value (e.g.. depreciation raises dollar prices and increases export quantities), whereas for irnport value these effects work against each other (e.g., depreciation raises dollar prices and lowers irnport quantities). Thus, it is not surprising that import value shows less comovement with the exchange rate.
Basic ecoriometric estimates confirm the visilal impression from Figures I and 2 . In a monthly VAR model of the exchange rate and the export value. the exchange rate shocks can be interpreted to convey ~nacroeconornic effects. while agricultural export shocks reflect principally sectoral developments. The exchange rate appears essentially exogenous (shocks to the exchange rate show little contemporaneous correlation with shocks to agr i c~~l t u r a l export value, and these "own" shocks explain over 985% of exchange rate forecast error variance for a 24-nionth horizon). Exchange rate shocks also have explanatory power for agricultural export value: they explain nearly 10% o f its forecast error variance for a 6-month horizon, nearly 20% for a 12-month horizon, and 35% for a 24-month hori7on. The dynamic responses of esport value to exchange rate and export shocks are shown in Figure 3 . Sectoral shocks show somewhat of a cyclical pattern over 2 years. while an appreciation of the dollar lowers the export value. The exchange rate impacts appear to be significant after a lag of 4 months and then have an increasing cumulative effect throi~gh 24 months In a similar model of agricultural import value, the exchange rate again appears essentially exogenous, hilt exchange rate shocks explain less than 2% of forecast error variance of imports through 24 months ahead. Thus, they have essentially no explariatory power in the rnodel for this side of aggregate U.S. agricultural trade.
Turning to exchange rate effects on agricultural prices, Xu and Orden provide some microeconomic evidence that is supportive of the dichotomy between flexible commodity prices and sticky industrial prices. Extending an analysis by Cartel; Gray, and Furtan, Xu and Orden examined the pass-through of quarterly Canadian1U.S. currency movements to prices of traded agric~~ltural outputs and nonExchange Rate Shock Export Shock farm-produced inputs over the period 1975-1999. Our empirical results contirn~ that shortrun acljustrnents to the law of one price (LOP) tend to occur quickly for five agricultural outputs (wheat, corn, soybeans. feeder steers, and slaughter steers) and. to a somewhat lesser extent and with longer lags, for three intermediate inputs (fertilizer, petroleum, and pesticides). The LOP is refuted for the capital input farm machinery even after 2 years of adjustment. Cointegration of farm output and input prices with the exchange rate was investigated to determine whether there i \ convergence of these nonst:~tionary series to the LOP as a stationary long-run ecjuilibl-ium. The results of the investigation suggest long-run sttrtionarity of the LOP for the five farm outputs but not for the inputs.
Evidence that the L20P holds more strongly for farm outputs than for inputs is consistent with a fixed-price/flex-price conceptual framework with farm commodity prices being Inore responsive to the exchange rate than industrial prices. For Canada and the United States. the output price increases associated with a devaluation are not completely offset by increases in input prices. Thus, farmers in Canada and the United States are affected by different production incentives when currency revaluations occur.
Consider the effects of the Canadian1U.S. exchange rate on output versus input prices for the I 0-year period 1990-199 1 to 1999-3000.
During this period. the Canadian dollar depreciated by 27.6%;, but farm machinery prices in Canada rose relative to those in the United States by only 4.5%. With the LOP holding approximately for farm outputs, Canz ' 1 d' lan versus U.S. prices of wheat. soybeans, corn, feeder steers, and slaughter steers relative to farm machinery prices rose from 20.9 to 34.9%). Agricultural output prices in Canada and the United States were also subject to substantial common fluctuations over this period, and the depreciation-related higher prices of the farmproduced outputs raised the costs of slaughter steer production in Canada. However, the lack of exchange rate pass-through to farm machinery prices compared with farm outputs means that depreciation provides some positive price incentives in Canada. With nominal and real depreciation tracking closely, farm output prices also rose relative to the costs of nontraded inputs or a broad index of the price level, again providing a positive production incentive.
Exchange Rates and Agricultural Policy
The analyses dexribed above suggest that real exchange rate movements matter to agriculture: they are not always dominant, but they can be. Appreciation of the dollar is observed to create agitation for protection and govern-ment support for trade sectors across indusConsider the case of the United States and tries and periods. Antidumping complaints the European Union. Under a strong FAIR from the U.S. steel industry-an industry Act, the European Union would find itself uswhose evolution to a capital-intensive c o n -ing acreage controls to sustain its farm policies petitive sector parallels that of agriculturewhile the United States pursued markct-driven are a reminder of the political pressures cur-production levels unfettered by annual ]and rency movements engender. Calls for a use restrictions. This situation would reverse lower-valued dollar have been echoed recently the previous relative effects on the competiacross Inany trade-dependent U.S. industries. tiveness of policies in the two blocs, where In agriculture, the 1996 Federal Agricul-from 1980 through 1995 the United States turd Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act used supply controls and the European Union, has suffered a near-death experience since for the part, did not, ~h~ E~~~~~~~ 1998. The wounds may prove fatal as 4 years union would be placed at a colnpetitive disof injections of substantial additional support advantage by the new mix. simultabeyond that included in the 1996 legislation neOusly, the united states would be positioned gives way to a new farm bill in 2002. Farm to press the E~~~~~~~ union i n international bill proposals include new permanent counter-negotiations increase market access and discyclical support programs providing billions cipline domestic and export subsidies. s u c h of dollars in subsidies. Loan rates may be action include giving up the raised, and acreage base and/or yield updating World Trade Organization exemptions for in the new bill could further undermine the with tied to production d e c o u~l i n g of farm from production controls, since the United States would no Iondecisions. Thus, the strong appreciation of the ger be using these exempted policies. The Eud o l l a~ which has pLlshed u.S. prices down and ropean Union has reasons of its own to move helped to set the stage for the enactment of toward decoupling and subsidy reductions as added support, is proving detrimental to farm it tries to accommodate expanded mernberpolicy by undermining reform in the United ship. Thus, convergent influences might culStates.
minate in further movement toward less marIt may seem unwarranted to conclude from ket intervention in agriculture. what is happening in the United States that the The dollar appreciation that has depressed appreciation of the dollar is having a detri-U.S. farm prices and exports makes such an mental effect on agricultural policy worldoptimistic reform scenario less likely. While wide. Appreciation of the U.S. dollar means depreciation of other currencies, so an offset-the new U.S. farm bill has yet to be enacted ting lowering of pressures for [arm policy in-(as of February 2002) , it is likely to contain terventions elsewhere might lead to solnething higher levels and more CRP acreage.
of a net wash. There are offsetting eftects of. With marketing loans, the United States will depreciations bringing less pressure for inter-avoid the stocks accumulation problem wherevent,ons elsewhere, but in a net by appreciation prompted lower loan rates in wash is the under the FAIR 1985. However, competitors in world markets the united states had moved far enough for-will decry the increased support as "unfair"
ward along the path of the decoupling of farm subsidi~ation, and the United States will lose support from ,narket interventions that ex-solne of its basis for arguing for greater libchange rate movements have had an asym-eralization worldwide (see, e.g.. Roberts and metric effect on policy evolution internation-Jotzo). Meanwhile, depreciation of other curally, For those countries in which depreciation rencies has lessened the cost of foreign farm has favored farm policy liberalization, the ef-supports. These are circumstances under fects on policy outcomes have not been as which convergent influences are less likely to strongly positive as the appreciation of the favor multilateral negotiation of farm policy U.S. dollar has proven detrimental. reforms.
Summing Up
T h i s paper has e x a m i n e d t h e cluestio~l o f e xc h a n g e rate effects o n agriculture raised forcefully by G. E d w a r d S c h u h s o m e 25 years a g o , w h e n a n e w e r a of flexible e x c h a n g e rates a n d international capital rnobility e m e r g e d world-
wide. E x c h a n g e rate m o v e m e n t s detestnine t h e w e d g e between the d o m e s t i c a n d foreign price s o f a traded g o o d . M o r e generally, they s e r v e a n equilibrating role w h e n m a r k e t s require a systematic m o v e m e n t in the relative prices o f traded a n d nontraded g o o d s . E xc h a n g e rate rnovenients d e p e n d o n international capital flows a n d the m a c r o e c o n o m i c fact o r s d e t e r m i n i n g t h e s e f l o w s , i n c l u d i n g monetary policy. M o n e t a r y s h o c k s h a v e nonneutral effects that explain s o m e o f t h e variability in agricultural prices. Moreover, macroeconomic conditions a r e often decisive in t h e determination of d o m e s t i c agricultural polices and, hence, levels of c o~n p e t i t i v e n e s s in world markets a n d tension in trade relations. T h e s e structural policy implications o f exc h a n g e rate movements. a l o n g w i t h their direct effects o n markets at a n y given m o m e n t in time, a r e w h y e x c h a n g e rates are important t o agriculture.
